How does the Owner define Morality? I ask.
That is a Huge Question, says the Owner.
It appears, I say, to be a Set of Rules designed to separate Moral Dogs and Lollies.
It is Far More than That, says the Owner.
Give it a Shot, I say. Make it Lolly-Relevant, I say.
Morality Describes Codes of Conduct Universally Accepted by all Rational Persons, says the Owner. Kant saw Morality as Rationally Necessary, says the Owner. Other Philosophers, such as Hobbes, Locke and Aquinas had argued that Morality was itself Rational, but Kant said we could not be Rational Without Morality.
If it is Rational to be Moral and Moral to be Rational, I say, how does One Determine if a Course of Action is both Moral and Rational? I say. Give it to me in Lollies, I say.
Kant suggested that a course of Action might be Moral and Rational if it was Universalisable, says the Owner.
That seems to suggest that Everyone can have a Lolly, I say.
Morality is not Only about Lollies, says the Owner. There are Other Considerations, says the Owner.
Such as? I say.
One could rely on the Harm Principle, says the Owner. John Stuart Mill articulated this principle in On Liberty, says the Owner, when he argued that the only purpose for which Power can be Rightfully Exercised over a Member of a Civilised Community, against his will, is to prevent Harm to others, says the Owner.
How can it be Harmful for the Moral Dog to have a Lolly? I ask.
It may make him Smug and Impossible on the subject of the Morality of Lollies, says the Owner.
You mean Even More Smug and Impossible than I already Am? I say. Is that Possible? I say. I understood I was already Expert, I say.
Argh, says the Owner.
It sounds to me as if the Kind of Harm justified by the Harm Principle is not Universally Agreed, I say.
It is Agreed regarding Lollies, says the Owner.
You said it was about More than just Lollies, I say. If it Were Universally Agreed then China would not have Imprisoned the Uighurs of Xinjiang in conditions in which their Human Rights are treated as Unrecognised and Irrelevant, I say. Perhaps, I say, China Interprets the Harm Principle Differently to the way a Rational and Moral Person would Interpret it, I say.
I am glad that the Moral Dog has Broadened his Horizons from Lollies to China, says the Owner. This is a Better Conversation for it, says the Owner.
I am glad you see the Relevance, I say. I say this Pointedly, given my particular Expertise in Smugness and Impossibility.
Is the Moral Dog comparing his Owner to China? Asks the Owner.
If his Owner is comparing Morality to Lolly Consumption, I say.
I do not think the Moral Dog could be more Smug and Impossible, says the Owner.
And as simply as that we established that I am having a Lolly.
The Moral Dog. Skilled in matters of Lolly Morality. Expert in Smugness and Impossibility.
Hergest the Hound
I am a dog of many thoughts.